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BEHAVIORAL GENETICS
AND CRIME, IN CONTEXT
OWEN D. JONES*
I
INTRODUCTION
Two experiences clarified for me precisely how worried people can get
about the legal implications of behavioral genetics. First, I attended the 1994
conference on genes and crime,1 at which interrupting protestors famously
chanted, “Maryland conference, you can’t hide; we know you’re pushing
genocide.” Two signs illustrated their concerns. One read: “Jobs, Not Prozac.”
The other read: “This Conference Predisposes Me to Disruptive Behavior
Disorder.”
The second experience was in 1997, when I was a panelist on the subject
“Biological Aspects of Human Action” at a conference of social scientists.
When my turn came, I had barely begun the opening sentences, which would
start in the most general terms to lay a foundation for why law should care
about biological influences on behavior, when a woman in the front row began
to shake her head—then her entire body—with obvious passion. I paused, and
asked what I had said that had so offended. Her reply, which was just as much a
non sequitur in the original as it will come across here, was, “I just don’t believe
we should put people in jail before they’ve done anything wrong.”
In each of these instances, the yawning gulf between what I or anyone else
was actually saying (or about to say) and the pre-empting assumption about
what we must mean, intend, and advocate was breathtaking. The leaps of logic
necessary to cross this divide typically reflect misunderstandings about the
relationships between biology and behavior, the relationships between genes
and environments, the implications of those relationships, the ways in which
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those implications will be considered, the goals a speaker is pursuing, and the
way those goals might be translated—if at all—into social, legal, or political
action. Some of these subjects I will touch on here, in an effort to provide some
context for considering the relationships between behavioral genetics and
crime.
One thing seems clear: misunderstandings or no, issues at the intersection
of behavioral genetics and crime will be with us for some time. Behavioral
genetics is developing at a quickening pace, and developments within that field
continue to inspire efforts to use them, principally in post-arrest contexts. State
v. Landrigan2 illustrates this point.
The defendant in Landrigan was born Billy Hill. Billy’s biological father—
the son of a man who was killed in a shootout with police—allegedly raped
Billy’s mother the first time they met. The two later became step-siblings and
subsequently married. Billy’s mother apparently abused alcohol and drugs
while pregnant with Billy. After Billy was born, his father went to prison and
his mother relinquished parental rights and ties.
When six months old, Billy was adopted by the Landrigan family and
renamed Jeffrey Landrigan. After a markedly troubled childhood, Landrigan
was sentenced to prison in Oklahoma for killing his best friend. While there, a
fellow inmate commented that Landrigan looked just like a man on death row
in Arkansas who—it later turned out—was Landrigan’s biological father.
Landrigan subsequently escaped from prison and traveled to Arizona, where he
committed and was convicted of another murder. The trial court sentenced
Landrigan to death, noting that Landrigan appeared to be an exceptionally
amoral person, utterly lacking remorse.3
On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence.4
Subsequently, the federal public defender replaced prior counsel and sought
habeas corpus relief on the grounds that, among other things, Landrigan’s first
counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate, develop, and introduce genetic
and other biological evidence.5 Upon preliminary exploration of various
biological angles, Landrigan’s attorneys argued that Landrigan was entitled to
present evidence of mitigating factors at a resentencing hearing. Specifically,
they sought to introduce evidence of genetic predisposition for disordered
behavior, in utero poisoning due to maternal drug and alcohol abuse during

2. Landrigan’s various circumstances as related here are drawn from several sources, including:
State v. Landrigan (Landrigan), 859 P.2d 111 (Ariz. 1993); Landrigan v. Stewart (Landrigan II), 272
F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2001); Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, Landrigan II, 272 F.3d 1221 (No. 00-99011);
Brief of Respondents-Appellees, Landrigan II, 272 F.3d 1221 (No. 00-99011); Landrigan v. Stewart
(Landrigan III), 397 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2005); 60 Minutes: Murder Gene; Man on Death Row Bases
Appeal on the Belief That His Criminal Tendencies are Inherited (CBS television broadcast February 27,
2001) [hereinafter 60 Minutes: Murder Gene].
3. Landrigan, supra note 2, at 117 (quoting the trial judge).
4. Landrigan, supra note 2.
5. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 2, at 45–51.
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pregnancy, early maternal rejection, and severe drug and alcohol addictions.6
They claimed that “Landrigan’s behavior and activities from infancy into
childhood, and through adulthood, were not the products of ‘free will’ as society
defines this term because Landrigan lacked the ability to make non-impulsive,
considered choices about his life’s path.”7 In other words, Landrigan’s actions
had been caused principally by his various genetic and other circumstances.
The United States District Court denied habeas corpus relief. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, indicating that the genetic argument
was “exotic” and that “assuring the court that genetics made him the way he is
could not have been very helpful.”8 Highlighting the double-edged nature of
genetic evidence, the court also concluded, “although Landrigan’s new evidence
can be called mitigating in some slight sense, it would also have shown the court
that it could anticipate that he would continue to be violent.”9 Landrigan
successfully petitioned for a rehearing en banc, arguing among other things that
the panel had neglected other independent biological arguments, including both
organic brain damage and the interaction of genetic and in utero environmental
influences. And the court recently affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded for an evidentiary hearing.10
It remains unclear what genetic evidence Landrigan will introduce, and how
significant that evidence will be. However, the Landrigan case illustrates the
criminal justice purposes for which some defense attorneys hope to use
behavioral genetics. Although it seems unlikely that Landrigan’s success will
ultimately turn on genetic evidence, it does seem likely that cases like
Landrigan’s will arise with increasing frequency. This is due not only to
advances in behavioral genetics (which, rightly or wrongly, are perceived to
offer hope to defendants) but also to every defense attorney’s obligation to
mount a rigorous defense. One way or another, the criminal justice system will
need to continue grappling with how to assess specific findings within
behavioral genetics, whether to admit genetic evidence, and how to do so (for
example, with what limitations and implications). One researcher explains the
situation this way:
Although it has been previously argued that genetics play no part in shaping antisocial
and criminal behavior, a growing literature base has served to substantiate that genetic
factors are as important to the development of some forms of criminal activity as are
environmental factors.
This attitudinal shift has occurred for several reasons. First, there are simply too
many studies, in too many countries, using different methodologies that converge on
the same conclusion: genes do play a role. Second, other, potentially less controversial
fields of behavioral trait research have not only identified heritability in psychiatric

6. Id. at 6.
7. Id. at 6–7.
8. Landrigan II, supra note 2, at 1228–29.
9. Id.
10. Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, Landrigan III, 397 F.3d 1235 (No. 0099011); Landrigan v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
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disorders such as autism, schizophrenia and reading disability, but also in personality
traits such as political conservatism. Thus, it would be surprising if criminal
behavior—particularly recidivistic crime—was not in some way influenced by genetic
11
factors.

Such views and developments have already sparked a number of scholars to
consider what behavioral genetics might mean for the criminal justice system.
For example, Friedland considers and critiques ways in which a “genetically
oriented criminal justice system” might differ from current approaches in
contexts of pre-trial release, character evidence at trial, post-trial release,
sentencing, and parole.12 Greely has asked the important question: how
accurate would a genetic test have to be (at predicting future dangerousness, for
instance) before it should be given significant weight?13
Others in this symposium will provide more detailed updates on the latest
findings from behavioral genetics and the latest cases in law to confront issues
raised by behavioral genetics.14 My task here is more general. Part II attempts
to situate behavioral genetics, criminal law, and their overlap within larger
contexts of law and biology. Part III attempts to situate the inquiries of this
symposium issue within the context of work to date on behavioral genetics and
crime. To help avoid needless duplication of efforts, it also provides a brief
summary of views, gleaned from a variety of different sources, on which it
appears the majority of relevant scientists and commentators have reached at
least tacit agreement. Part IV then outlines some of the complications and
implications of discussing behavioral genetics and crime, including definitional
and methodological challenges, as well as implications for free will and
responsibility. Finally, Part V raises two issues worth exploring. The first
concerns how the respective contributions of behavioral genetics and behavioral
ecology will compare over time, and how those efforts might best be joined.
The second issue concerns what it would mean to put environmental

11. Sharon S. Ishikawa & Adrian Raine, Behavioral Genetics and Crime, in THE NEUROBIOLOGY
81–82 (Joseph Glicksohn ed., 2002) (internal citations omitted).
12. Steven I. Friedland, The Criminal Law Implications of the Human Genome Project:
Reimagining a Genetically Oriented Criminal Justice System, 86 KY. L.J. 303 (1997–98).
13. Henry T. Greely, Prediction, Litigation, Privacy, and Property, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE
LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: A REPORT ON AN INVITATIONAL MEETING
CONVENED BY THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE AND THE DANA
FOUNDATION 114, 120–23 (Brent Garland ed., 2004) [hereinafter NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW].
14. Some relatively recent overviews appear in Ishikawa & Raine, supra note 11; L. F. Lowenstein,
The Genetic Aspects of Criminality, 8 J. HUM. BEHAV. SOC. ENV’T 63 (2003); Richard P. Epstein &
Robert H. Belmaker, Genetics of Sensation or Novelty Seeking and Criminal Behavior, in THE
NEUROBIOLOGY OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 11, at 5l. The Human Genome Project’s
introduction to Behavioral Genetics appears at http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_
Genome/elsi/behavior.shtml.
A recent overview prepared in association with the American
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) and The Hastings Center is CATHERINE BAKER,
BEHAVIORAL GENETICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO HOW GENES AND ENVIRONMENTS INTERACT
THROUGH DEVELOPMENT TO SHAPE DIFFERENCES IN MOOD, PERSONALITY AND INTELLIGENCE
(2004). A more thorough introduction appears in ROBERT PLOMIN ET AL., BEHAVIORAL GENETICS
(Robert Plomin ed., 4th ed. 2001).
OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 81,
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considerations and genetic considerations on equal footing in the criminal
justice system—and whether such a thing would be desirable.
II
CONTEXTUALIZING BEHAVIORAL GENETICS AND CRIME
On the one hand, taking behavioral biology into account in criminal law is
not, in itself, new. For example, we implicitly take developmental biology into
account when defining different levels of civil or criminal responsibility on the
basis of age—as when state contract law allows minors to void contracts or the
Supreme Court holds that a state cannot constitutionally execute an adult for a
crime he committed when under the age of eighteen.15 Numerous states allow
that various mental diseases (such as schizophrenia) and various brain injuries
(such as those damaging the prefrontal cortex) can reduce moral
blameworthiness.16
And epilepsy can, in some circumstances, preclude
blameworthiness entirely.17 On the other hand, there is a general perception
that steadily quickening developments in biology will enable greater and
greater biological insight into the causal processes underlying human behavior,
with consequences both important and disturbing for criminal law.
To situate the specific topic of behavioral genetics and crime, two points
need noting at the outset. First, behavioral genetics is but one of many fields
within behavioral biology that are potentially relevant to crime. Second, crime
is but one area of law to which behavioral genetics is potentially relevant.
A. Behavioral Genetics within Behavioral Biology
For those interdisciplinary legal thinkers who draw principally on the social
sciences and humanities, the corpus of biology relevant to behaviors that are in
turn relevant to law is generally undifferentiated—if indeed biological
influences on behavior are contemplated at all. Unfortunately, lumping all of
behavioral biology together prevents meaningful consideration of where
biology is most and least likely to be useful in law.
In fact, scientists study the biology of behavior in a wide variety of biological
subdisciplines in addition to behavioral genetics. These include, for example,
evolutionary biology, evolutionary ecology, animal behavior, developmental
biology, cognitive neuroscience, and behavioral ecology, as well as
neuroanatomy, brain chemistry, evolutionary psychology, Darwinian medicine,
Darwinian psychiatry, psychopharmacology, neurophysiology, brain imaging,
and, most recently, neuroeconomics. Although the boundaries between these

15. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 (2005).
16. See C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Mental or Emotional Condition as Diminishing Responsibility
for Crime, 22 A.L.R. 3d 1228, §§ 1–2, 5–9 (1968; 2005).
17. Eunice A. Eichelberger, Annotation, Automatism or Unconsciousness as Defense to Criminal
Charge, 27 A.L.R. 4th 1067, § 6(a) (1984).
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fields blur at the edges, as one might expect, the fields yield different insights,
from different perspectives, from scientists trained differently.
Put another way: behavioral geneticists are not the only biologists to study
the effects of genes on behavior, nor do all biologists studying behavior study
genes. For example, neurological damage (particularly brain damage)—
whether prenatal or postnatal—can affect behavior regardless of a person’s
Fetal maldevelopment, cortisol, testosterone,
genetic complement.18
hypoglycemia, lead ingestion, and various birth complications, as well as
nicotine or cocaine exposure during pregnancy, are among the many other
biological phenomena that can have powerful effects on behavior relevant to
law.19
B. Crime within Behavioral Genetics
Just as behavioral genetics is but one of many fields within behavioral
biology that are potentially relevant to crime, crime is but one area of law to
which behavioral genetics is potentially relevant. One could imagine that if
behavioral genetics were to usefully illuminate predispositions relevant to
crime, it might also help illuminate predispositions relevant to many other areas
of law. For example, scholars continue to debate the proper effects on health
law (insurance coverage, for example) of discernible genetic effects on
susceptibility to disease. Possible genetic effects on sexual preferences could
affect family law, genetic effects on risk perceptions could affect various
regulatory policies, and genetic effects on acquisitive behavior could affect
corporate law, and the like.
III
POINTS OF (NEAR) CONSENSUS
There are many ways to approach the intersection of behavioral genetics
and crime. Some of the many relevant questions include: (a) What do we think
we know? (b) How might that knowledge aid various legal goals? (c) Would the
likely benefits of incorporating such knowledge—given the potential for error,
misunderstanding, or misuse—exceed the likely costs? (d) What kinds of
knowledge are and are not likely to emanate from behavioral genetics in the
future? The existing literature on behavioral genetics and crime suggests that

18. See Hanna Damsio, et al., The Return of Phineas Gage: Clues about the Brain from the Skull of
a Famous Patient, 264 SCIENCE 1102 (1994) (providing discussion of a classic case of behavioral
changes consequent to brain damage).
19. Useful discussion appears in ADRIAN RAINE, THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF CRIME: CRIMINAL
BEHAVIOR AS A CLINICAL DISORDER 191–213 (1993). See also Diana H. Fishbein, How Can
Neurobiological Research Inform Prevention Strategies?, in THE SCIENCE, TREATMENT, AND
PREVENTION OF ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIORS: APPLICATION TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 25-1
(Diana H. Fishbein ed., 2000).
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there are a number of points on which everyone, or nearly everyone, seems to
agree:20
(1) Behavior is a complex phenomenon, neither attributable to single
causes nor easily parsed among multiple causes.
(2) All behavior results from the interaction of genes, environments,
developmental history, and the evolutionary processes that built the
brain to function in the ways it does.
(3) Genes and learning are not mutually exclusive explanations for
behavior, for genes affect learning and contribute to cultural patterns
that are common to the species.
(4) The human organism is neither genetically determined nor
environmentally determined, but rather possesses multiple potentials
that arise through the successive interactions of genes and
environments.
(5) To say something is genetically influenced is not to say that
environmental influences are irrelevant.
(6) To say a behavior is genetically influenced—even with high
heritability—is not to say it is inevitable, unalterable, or “determined”
in any inflexible sense. A predisposition is not a predestination.21
(7) A high statistical correlation between the presence of a particular
allele22 and a behavior does not necessarily indicate any particular
causal connection between that allele and the behavior.
(8) There is no gene or set of genes (or allele or set of alleles) that are
for—or directly responsible for—criminal behavior.
(9) Criminal behavior is influenced by both environmental and genetic
forces, as well as by their interaction.
(10) To say that genes influence behaviors relevant to crime does not mean
that genetics can explain why certain individuals commit crime.
(11) To say a behavior is natural, biological, or genetically influenced is
never to say it is for that reason good or excusable, or automatically
entitled to any legal deference or relevance whatsoever. Explanation
is not exculpation.

20. These are distilled from a wide range of sources, including RAINE, supra note 19; Ishikawa &
Raine, supra note 11; David Wasserman & Robert Wachbroit, Introduction: Methods, Meanings, and
Morals, in GENETICS AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 1 (David Wasserman & Robert Wachbroit eds.,
2001); Elliot Sober, Separating Nature and Nurture, in GENETICS AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR, supra, at
47. See also Gregory Carey & Irving I. Gottesman, Genes and Antisocial Behavior: Perceived versus
Real Threats to Jurisprudence, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 342 (2006).
21. Arguably, there are some very limited exceptions. So far as we know, for example, everyone
with the allele for Huntington’s Disease eventually will display behavioral manifestations of the
disease, if they live long enough. Yet even here there can be significant variation in age of onset and
rapidity of the course of the disease.
22. Alleles are different variants (forms) of two or more genes that reside at a specifically named
genetic locus. Discussions of genetic differences among individuals ordinarily refer not to individuals
having different genes per se, but rather to individuals having different alleles of genes.
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(12) A person’s behavior can be genetically influenced and still be subject
to legitimate moral condemnation.
(13) The extent to which different alleles of genes influence behaviors
relevant to crime provides no justification for human eugenics.
(14) The extent to which different alleles of genes influence behaviors
relevant to crime provides no justification for discrimination.
These points of consensus or near-consensus highlight the extent to which all
human behavior—the criminal necessarily included—is a complex
phenomenon. It is difficult to know what one can say with reasonable
confidence about the probability that biology generally or behavioral genetics
specifically will be useful to the criminal law.
For example, one commentator argues that “our judicial system ultimately
must address[] the criminal responsibility one will bear for committing a crime
when the actions are determined by the actor’s genetic makeup . . . . which
rendered him unable to exercise free and independent will to restrain from
committing the offense . . . .”23 On the one hand, the commentator seems right
to raise a question about how behavioral genetics will affect the legal system’s
approach to criminal behavior. On the other hand, the commentator seems
distinctly outside the biology mainstream to frame the question in terms
positing that actions may be “determined by the actor’s genetic makeup.” As
has often been noted, imagining that an individual’s behavior is determined by
genes in any hard sense, irrespective of environment, is a bit like imagining that
the area of a rectangle is the product only of its length, irrespective of its width.24
So it seems likely that questions framed in this way have more rhetorical than
actual use.

23. Marcia Johnson, Genetic Technology and Its Impact on Culpability for Criminal Actions, 46
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 443, 444, 466 (1998). In a similar vein, the commentator states:
Once genes for behavior are identified, many geneticists believe a person’s genetic
predisposition to violent behavior can be shown. When that predisposition is so compelling
that a person cannot overcome the compulsion to act in accordance with noncriminal
behavior, then he or she is not responsible for his or her actions. A criminal defendant
suffering such a genetic predisposition could be found not guilty by reason of genetic
predisposition . . . .
Id. at 470.
24. The key point is that genetic determinism is incoherent. Nonetheless, the rectangle analogy
requires additional explanation, highlighting the initially counterintuitive result that although it is
impossible to ascertain separate contributions of genes and environment to an individual’s behavior, it
is simultaneously possible (at least in theory) to closely estimate the separate contributions of genes or
environment to the variance in behavior across a population. Plomin usefully illustrates this in his
discussion of the often misunderstood concept of “heritability.” He notes length and width contribute
equally and indivisibly to the area of a single rectangle. At the same time, given a population of
rectangles having (for instance) a constant width, one could state with confidence that one hundred
percent of any variance among the rectangles in area can be attributed to differences among the
rectangles in their lengths. See PLOMIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 85–91.
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IV
COMPLICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
David Wasserman—a scholar who has long been thinking about genes and
crime—captures the present situation this way: “No serious researcher believes
that there are genes for crime; no responsible critic believes that genetic
differences have no effect on personality and behavioral disposition.”25 If the
statement is true (I believe it is), and if most commentators would agree the
statement is true (I believe they would), then why do commentators so
frequently talk past one another? The principle reasons can be divided into
three general categories: definitions, methods, and implications.
A. Definitions
There are at least two kinds of definitional problems. The first concerns the
different meanings attributed to words used in discussion of behavioral genetics
and crime. For example, one person might be using the term “behavioral
genetics” loosely—perhaps intending to refer broadly to biological influences
on behavior—while another uses or understands the term according to its more
precise meaning.26 Similarly, discussants may part ways when using the words
“heritable” or “heritability.” One might intend to refer generally to the
capacity of a trait to be inherited genetically; the other may use or understand
heritability in its more technical sense as “the proportion of phenotypic
variance that is attributable to genotypic variance.”27 Some might be using
“gene” (knowingly or unknowingly) as a shorthand for “allele of a gene,” “a
combination of genes,” or “a combination of alleles,” while a listener interprets
the usage more literally.
The second definitional problem concerns the link between an allele and a
given criminal behavior. That link in fact spans a great distance. Consider:
genes code for amino acid sequences, which string together in long chains to
make proteins, which in turn are used to build neural architecture, which is in
turn influenced by environmental conditions, which conditions may also affect
what genes are active when, which may in turn affect information processing in
ways that in turn lead to increases or decreases in the probability of defined
behaviors.
But what behaviors, really, are we talking about? Labeling a behavior as
“criminal” is not meaningfully similar, in this respect, to labeling a behavior as
chewing, drinking, or swallowing. The latter words code for very specific
behavior on which all but the most philosophical would agree. What is criminal,
on the other hand, varies by culture, time, and context—it is socially rather than
biologically defined. And as Rutter put it, “Genes do not, and cannot, code for
25. David Wasserman, Research into Genetics and Crime: Consensus and Controversy, 15 POL. &
LIFE SCI. 107, 107 (1996).
26. For more on that meaning, see infra Part V.
27. PLOMIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 349.
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socially defined behaviors.”28 In addition, things socially defined as crimes are
often quite different from one another and, within their own categories, are not
meaningfully homogenous.29 As Epstein and Belmaker note, “Criminality is a
complex phenotype and is characterized by a wide spectrum of acts, from nonviolent white collar crimes to serial killings.”30
Perhaps as a partial reaction to definitional ambiguities, there is a marked
tendency in discussions of behavioral genetics and crime to focus on violent
behaviors, notwithstanding the fact that a great deal of crime is theft. But this
offers little analytic comfort, for even if we were to explicitly limit a discussion
to a subset of criminal acts—such as violence—even this does not represent a
single behavioral category.31 Premeditated murders are meaningfully different
from bar-room brawls—as are beatings, rapes, and torture. And even these
phenomena are not uniform. Moreover, we know that the motives for
committing even a single criminal act can vary dramatically, with implications
for the principal goals of criminal law: deterrence, retribution, isolation, and
rehabilitation. For instance, a person might commit arson because she is a
pyromaniac, because she wants to cover up evidence of a separate property
crime, because she wants the insurance money, because she seeks revenge, or
for a variety of other reasons.
B. Methods
Much of the inherent difficulty in figuring out the relationship between
genes, crime, and the criminal justice system flows from the same difficulties
encountered in other areas linking science and potential legal implications.
What have studies actually shown? How confident are we that the findings may
be generalized? What are the possible implications of what we believe to be
true? What are the projected costs and benefits of those implications? How
should variations in the kinds of implications affect how confident we should be
in scientific findings before acting in reliance upon them? In what legal
contexts, and how, should science make a difference?

28. Michael Rutter, Concluding Remarks, in GENETICS OF CRIMINAL AND ANTISOCIAL
BEHAVIOR 266 (Gregory R. Bock & Jamie A. Goode eds., 1996).
29. Pamela J. Taylor, Forward, in THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 11,
at xiiv, xiv-xvi; Troy Duster, The Implications of Behavioral Genetics Inquiry for Explanations of the
Link Between Crime, Violence, and Race 6–7 (Dec. 15, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author, cited by permission of Troy Duster); Troy Duster, Selective Arrests, An Ever-Expanding DNA
Forensic Database, and the Specter of an Early-Twenty-First-Century Equivalent of Phrenology, in DNA
AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 315 (David Lazer, ed., 2004)
[hereinafter Duster, Selective Arrests]. See also Tabitha M. Powledge, Genetics and the Control of
Crime, 46 BIOSCIENCE 7, 7 (1996) (“[T]hat motley mass of disparate actions—ranging from stock fraud
to serial homicide—we lump under the catchall rubric crime.”).
30. Epstein & Belmaker, supra note 14, at 51.
31. See Stephen C. Maxson, Issues In The Search For Candidate Genes In Mice As Potential Animal
Models Of Human Aggression, in GENETICS OF CRIMINAL AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note
28, at 21, 24.
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In addition to carrying these typical law–science difficulties, human
behavioral biology carries at least four more, each of which compounds
problems significantly. First, with only rare exceptions, each organism in a
sexually reproducing species is genetically unique. Second, each human
organism is environmentally unique, encountering its own combinations of
experiences from womb to tomb.
Third, obvious ethical constraints
accompanying differences between humans and other animals mean that only a
tiny fraction of the potential experiments that might control for various
confounds can be administered.
Fourth, the proximate mechanisms linking genes and behavior are
incredibly complex, as Schaffner, among others, has vividly described.
Schaffner notes that behaviors are generated by groups of neurons acting
together, a single genetic change can affect multiple neurons, a single neuron
can affect multiple behaviors, and multiple neurons can affect the same
behavior.32 In addition, many genes can affect one neuron, development can
affect neuronal connections, differences in environment can yield different
behaviors through short-term environmental influence (such as learning),
environments can create long-term environmental influence (by affecting the
expression of genes that affect behavior), and one gene can affect another gene
that can in turn affect behavior.
Each of these four difficulties poses important problems for what can be
learned from dissimilar human subjects, what can be predicted about subjects
not yet studied, and with what confidence we should hold our tentative
conclusions about the relationships between behavioral genetics and crime.
Chastened but uncowed by these problems, scientists simply endeavor to do the
best they can with what they have. For example, studying identical and
fraternal twins reared apart, and comparing those groups, provides useful
controls for genetic variation.33 Comparing findings from genetic studies of
prison populations with findings of such studies in unincarcerated populations
may also yield important clues, if allele frequencies at a particular genetic locus
were to differ significantly between the two populations.
Such studies are nevertheless imperfect, as a number of critics have argued.34
For example, adoption placements are not random, and selective placement

32. Kenneth F. Schaffner, Complexity and Research Strategies in Behavioral Genetics, in
BEHAVIORAL GENETICS: THE CLASH OF CULTURE AND BIOLOGY 61 (Ronald A. Carson & Mark
Rothstein eds., 1999). The balance of this paragraph is drawn from id. at 74, 76.
33. For discussions of methods generally, see Ishikawa & Raine, supra note 11; RAINE, supra note
19, at 54–78. For further information, see NANCY L. SEGAL, INDIVISIBLE BY TWO: LIVES OF
EXTRAORDINARY TWINS 2–3 (2005); Stephanie L. Sherman & Irwin D. Waldman, Identifying the
Molecular Genetic Basis of Behavioral Traits, in BEHAVIORAL GENETICS: THE CLASH OF CULTURE
AND BIOLOGY, supra note 32, at 35; Dorret Boomsma et al., Classical Twin Studies and Beyond, 3
NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 872 (2002).
34. See, e.g., Sober, supra note 20; Lowenstein, supra note 14. Useful discussions of some
limitations to methods appear in David Wasserman, Is there Value in Identifying Individual Genetic
Predispositions to Violence?, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 24 (2004); and Duster, Selective Arrests, supra
note 29.
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factors can confound efforts to extract useful and reliable information from
adoption studies.35 Moreover, such studies occasionally lead us down a path
that later proves incorrect—as was the case with early studies suggesting that
the unusual XYY chromosomal complement meaningfully predisposed its
bearer to violent criminal activity.36 In addition, important questions also
surround the validities of measurements, as well as complications arising from
the search not just for genes, but also for relevant interactions of genes and
environments.
C. Implications
It is, of course, in the realm of implications that the future for behavioral
genetics and crime is most hotly contested. Many others (including many
contributing to this symposium) have mapped and continue to map this
territory in detail. What follows here provides several introductory but key
concepts about the implications of behavioral genetics for criminal law that are
also useful when navigating the terrain.
1. Free Will and Responsibility
As is well known, the criminal law is one of the few areas of law in which
motive matters. In general, the criminal law cares whether a person has
requisite mental intent, choosing freely to perform an act, and choosing with an
awareness of distinctions between right and wrong. It is therefore in criminal
law that issues of free will are often raised—and it is in the context of free will
that the influence of biology on behavior generates concerns.
A key question, of course, is whether free will exists in the first place. On
the one hand, all but the most physically or mentally constrained humans
perceive life as an endless series of choices. Economic, social, political, and
religious conditions, among others, may present constraints within which choice
will be exercised. But at some meaningful level individuals still choose what to
do, when to do it, and, indeed, whether to abide by many of the social

35. Lowenstein, supra note 14, at 67.
36. Wasserman and Wachbroit summarize the episode succinctly:
In 1965, researchers found an apparently high prevalence of [the XYY chromosomal
combination] among prison inmates in Britain. That is to say, the percentage of prison
inmates with XYY was higher than the percentage of XYY males in the general population.
Unfortunately, many people quickly took this finding to be evidence of a direct link between
an extra Y chromosome and a tendency to hyperaggressivity and violence. That assumption
was eventually rejected by genetic researchers, but it held sway in the popular imagination
long enough to stigmatize a generation of XYY males and (reportedly) lead to the abortion of
a significant number of [XYY] fetuses . . . . It is now widely believed that if an extra Y
chromosome leads to incarceration, it is by a indirect route. XYY individuals are no more
aggressive than average, but they may be taller and less intelligent, hyperactive, and generally
more impulsive. Their increased risk of arrest or conviction may stem from an increased
likelihood of getting caught, or of committing crimes more likely to be detected, rather than
from heightened aggressiveness or greater disregard for social norms.
Wasserman & Wachbroit, supra note 20, at 9 (citations omitted).
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constraints encountered. So human will seems “free,” even if it does not result
in limitless possibilities.
On the other hand, all choices emerge from the human nervous system.
And each state of the nervous system is, in part, a function of the prior state of
that nervous system. The system is composed of molecules, in turn composed
of atoms, and it is driven by chemical reactions and electrical circuits. The
nervous system and its brain are therefore part of a material world in which
present events are caused by prior events, extending back to the beginning of
time and matter. If genes we inherit affect our nervous systems in ways that
affect our behavior, in what sense is our will free?
This question opens the door to a series of pressing and yet seemingly
intractable problems, many of which have challenged commentators for ages.37
How free must will be in order to justify the law’s punishment of actors who
behave criminally? Is free will binary, such that you have it or you don’t? If
not binary, is there any reliable way to measure the proportion in which a
person’s action was free? If there were such a way to measure free will, how
much, in a given context, will be necessary for purposes of exculpation at trial,
or mitigation at sentencing?38
Most commentators subscribe to beliefs within a grey zone of compatibilism.
The central idea of compatibilism is that—in all but the rarest cases—adult
humans should be deemed to have free will in sufficient quantities (whatever
that may mean) to justify holding them legally accountable for their behaviors.
As always, however, the precise location of the threshold is unclear. And here
behavioral genetics presents complications that are new in detail, but in fact old
in kind. Behavioral genetics may afford us tools for more clearly understanding
the multiple causes that lead to behavior, but whether that behavior reflects the
operation of a normal brain is a question the legal system has already been
asking in the mental health context for a long time.39
2. The Separate Realms of “Is” and “Ought”
Even if we were able to identify, with reasonable specificity, some
combination of alleles and environment that significantly increased the
37. See generally Michael S. Gazzaniga & Megan S. Steven, Free Will in the Twenty-First Century:
A Discussion of Neuroscience and the Law, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW, supra note 13, at 51;
Stephen J. Morse, New Neuroscience, Old Problems, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW, supra note 13,
at 157; Wasserman & Wachbroit, supra note 20, at 201–327; Richard Lowell Nygaard, Freewill,
Determinism, Penology, and the Human Genome: Where’s A New Leibniz When We Really Need Him?,
3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 417, 423 (1996); Matthew Jones, Note, Overcoming the Myth of Free
Will in Criminal Law: The True Impact of the Genetic Revolution, 52 DUKE L.J. 1031 (2003).
38. A number of these issues are explored in Gazanniga & Steven, supra note 37; Morse, supra
note 37; Steven Goldberg, Evolutionary Biology Meets Determinism: Learning from Philosophy, Freud,
and Spinoza, 53 FLA. L. REV. 893 (2001); Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and
Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 485–88 (2005).
39. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Is Atkins The Antithesis Or Apotheosis Of Anti-Discrimination
Principles?: Sorting Out The Groupwide Effects Of Exempting People With Mental Retardation From
The Death Penalty, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1101 (2004); Christopher Slobogin, Rethinking Legally Relevant
Mental Disorder, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 497 (2003).
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likelihood of certain behaviors labeled criminal, it is a separate question
whether that information ought to play any role in criminal justice. We could
not, for example, legitimately conclude that simply because a convicted
individual has certain alleles relevant to the behavior at issue, he is entitled to
greater leniency.
The reason is simple: the realms of fact and meaning are logically distinct.
That is, the realm of what “is” and the realm of what “ought-to-be” are as
necessarily separate as description and prescription. Explanation is not
justification. And one simply cannot move from facts to normative conclusions
without passing through a prism of human values. Arguments to the contrary—
which seek to draw causal arrows directly from fact to normative conclusion—
have long been recognized as committing the grave logical error labeled the
“naturalistic fallacy.”40
Moreover, even if we were able to identify, with reasonable specificity, some
combination of alleles and environment that significantly increased the
likelihood of certain behaviors labeled criminal, and even if we were inclined to
find normative meaning in biological fact, it would often be unclear what that
normative meaning would be. Genetic information can cut in different
directions simultaneously. For instance, we could conclude it mitigates (if
responsibility seems materially lessened), we could conclude it exacerbates (if
greater deterrence seems advisable to offset greater proclivities), or we could
conclude it has no or some other implication.
In any case, there are no convenient shortcuts from “is” to “ought.” We
cannot avoid the hard work of netting out our often competing values by
imagining that increasing advances in behavioral genetics will make our legal
responsibilities easier.
3. The “Isms”
Over time, people have found cause—often good cause—to be concerned
about ways that biology can be invoked in the service of sexism, racism, genetic
determinism, eugenics, and Social Darwinism (more properly though less
commonly known as Social Spencerism41). These collected subjects, each
significant in its own right, serve as an important backdrop against which all
discussions of behavioral genetics and crime take place. Consequently, no
effort to put behavioral genetics and crime in context could be complete
without acknowledging that history gives ample reason to be skeptical about the
uses to which biological information will be put. Missteps are not uncommon,

40. The term apparently was coined by G.E. Moore in Principia Ethica. See G.E. MOORE,
PRINCIPIA ETHICA 90 (Thomas Baldwin ed., rev. ed. 1993). The concept traces back, however, to
David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE
469–70 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch eds., Oxford, 2d ed. 1978) (1739–40).
41. Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 38, at 492–93.
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as is illustrated by reexamining the history of phrenology, craniometry, and the
XYY controversy.42
Although it is important to be alert to the possibility that people will either
misunderstand the biology in a way that leads to misuse, or count on other
people misunderstanding the biology in a way that opens the door to intentional
misuse, two things bear noting. First, it is important to recognize that there is
nothing inherent in the underlying biological reality that justifies any of these
uses.43 The uses are always a function of the injection of various human values,
many of which have nothing to do with the biology itself. Second, it is rarely
clear ex ante that we are better off without information that could be misused,
since the lack of information also imposes its own costs.44
4. The Wide Variety of Criminal Justice Contexts to Consider
When discussing possible interactions of behavioral genetics and the
criminal law, it is important to keep in mind the wide variety of potential
interactions, spanning the preventive, the corrective, and the therapeutic. Each
creates its own fork in the analytic road. Are we interested in pre-offense
identifications? If so, what kind of screenings—if any—could legitimately be
implemented? Are we interested in pre-offense interventions? If so, of what
kind? Are we interested in post-offense treatment? If so, are social, chemical,
or genetic treatments worth pursuing? Each choice risks a misstep, warranting
more than customary caution and deliberation.
V
TWO ISSUES WORTH EXPLORING
The preceding survey of some of the many themes bearing on this
conference is necessarily short. There are many possible launching points for
further discussion. Here are two worth exploring.
A. Relative Contributions of Behavioral Genetics and Behavioral Ecology
It is often noted that people tend to misunderstand behavioral biology.45
One of the key misunderstandings concerns the distinction between behavioral
42. Duster, Selective Arrests, supra note 29, at 8–10. Useful discussions of the XYY controversy
appear in RAINE, supra note 19, at 47–53; Deborah Denno, Legal Implications of Genetic and Crime
Research, in GENETICS OF CRIMINAL AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, supra note 28, at 248; Deborah
Denno, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free Will or Free Ride?, 137 U. PENN L. REV. 615
(1988).
43. This is explored in much greater detail in Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 38, at 484–99.
44. See Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 38, at 499. Nygaard phrases this idea somewhat
differently—“[I]gnorance can also be used for illegitimate purposes”—and suggests the results can be
at least as or even more culturally destructive. Nygaard, supra note 37, at 430.
45. For example, some commentators note the importance of distinguishing the study of behavior
generally from the study of behavioral differences attributable to differences in genetics. See
Wasserman & Wachbroit, supra note 20, at 5; Martin Daly, Evolutionary Adaptationism: Another
Biological Approach to Criminal and Antisocial Behavior, in GENETICS OF CRIMINAL AND
ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 28, at 183. Others have argued for the importance of
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genetics and an area of study that goes by various names, including behavioral
ecology.
The distinction, essentially, is this. Behavioral genetics often focuses on how
different behaviors from different individuals can arise from genetic differences
among the individuals. Behavioral ecology generally focuses on how different
behaviors from different individuals can arise when evolved and algorithmic
predispositions that are widely shared among brains encounter different
environmental circumstances.46 The important distinction between behavioral
genetics and behavioral ecology is not whether environments affect behavior; in
both fields environmental conditions are vitally important. The important
difference in disciplinary focus is that behavioral genetics often looks for
differences in behaviors that can be attributed largely to genetic differences,
while behavioral ecology generally looks for differences in environments that
lead organisms with evolved neural architectures that are fundamentally similar
to behave differently from one another.
These two related subfields provide complementary rather than competing
perspectives—two sides of a coin. The question is not which one is right.
Instead, the questions are: (1) how might each perspective aid legal efforts to
achieve social goals; and (2) how do the perspectives differ on dimensions
relevant to their ultimate utility in law?
One initially tempting approach to answering these questions is to think that
behavioral ecology is more useful at the broad policy level, while behavioral
genetics may be more useful in litigation contexts. That is, some might be
tempted to conclude that behavioral ecology is the more useful of the two
perspectives when legal thinkers and lawmakers are attempting to change,
through law, environmental conditions a large population encounters—to
reduce violent aggression in society, for example. And some might be tempted
to conclude that behavioral genetics is the more useful of the two perspectives
when an individual’s behavior is at issue.
Yet the utilities of behavioral ecology and behavioral genetics are probably
not so neatly divisible. For one thing, both behavioral ecology and behavioral
genetics can be important tools for identifying the kinds of environmental
conditions that are likely to increase the probability of criminal acts, either
through the conditional and algorithmic processes behavioral ecology studies or
through the context-sensitive, gene-environment interactions that behavioral
geneticists study.47 For another, both fields are inherently probabilistic, rather

incorporating evolutionary perspectives on crime. See MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE
(1988); RAINE, supra note 19, at 27–46; Alan Gibbard, Genetic Plans, Genetic Differences, and
Violence: Some Chief Possibilities, in GENETICS AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 20, at 169; and
Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 38, at 484–98.
46. Efforts to represent this distinction graphically appear in Owen D. Jones, Proprioception, NonLaw, and Biolegal History, 53 FLORIDA L. REV. 831, 840 (2001) and in Jones & Goldsmith, supra note
38, at 501.
47. See, e.g., Fishbein, supra note 19 (proposing structuring the environment to minimize risk
factors). Fishbein notes that neurobiological research can be used to help identify individual
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than deterministic. Application to given individuals is therefore, under any
circumstances, complicated and indeterminate, at best. For instance, even if an
individual convicted of a crime bears a genetic sequence positively correlated in
a population with behavioral predispositions relevant to the crime he
committed, behavioral genetics still does not answer a question often important
at the sentencing phase: why did this individual commit this criminal act?
If one of our main interests is in reducing crime, rather than in simply
increasing the number of contexts in which behavioral genetics is used, then the
advantages and disadvantages of behavioral genetics and behavioral ecology
should be explored. More particularly, we should consider ways in which those
perspectives—each of which identifies biological processes that can be
simultaneously operating in every person—can be usefully integrated in
furtherance of a synthetic, and hopefully improved, approach.
For example, one weakness of the way behavioral genetics information
tends to be understood by nonscientists is that it inclines people to think that
crime is somehow principally the result of criminals having genes (or, more
precisely particular alleles of genes) that noncriminals do not have. This can
mislead us into thinking that crime comes far more from “criminal minds” than
from what we might call “criminal moments”—opportunities to gain personal
advantage through means society defines as criminal that the species-typical
brain will notice and find tempting. The behavioral ecology perspective
suggests that even if we were to magically and instantaneously sequester all
those who had ever committed a crime, the positive effect on subsequent crime
rates would be dampened by the probability that otherwise law-abiding citizens
would move opportunistically into the vacuums created.
Conversely, one weakness of the way insights from behavioral ecology can
be internalized is that the foregoing could be misunderstood to suggest that all
people are materially the same, and that therefore genetic differences are
irrelevant to criminal behaviors. This could distract attention from those
probably rare but significant contexts in which a person who behaved criminally
bears some highly influential genetic trait that, while not determining his
behavior, could have played a sufficient role such that a just society would want
to consider whether that role might be mitigating at a sentencing phase. The
behavioral genetic perspective suggests that, even when encountering
environmental conditions that most people find irrelevant or only trivially
relevant to the probability that they would commit a criminal act, some people
will find such an environment disinhibiting.

vulnerabilities as a function of genetic, biological, and environmental conditions; assist in identifying
environmental conditions that trigger antisocial behavior and drug-taking behaviors, among other
vulnerabilities; signal which prevention programs under which specific conditions will likely be most
effective (including methods for early detection, interventions, treatments, and primary prevention
strategies); and decrease reliance on incarceration by emphasizing the superiority of public health and
medical approaches. Id. at 25-3.
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This suggests we should neither categorically nor cavalierly exclude
evidence of the sort Landrigan seeks to introduce in his case. At the same time,
it is not going to be easy, given the inherent complications explored above, for
legal thinkers and behavioral biologists to settle on a sensible, fair, and
administratively workable approach that balances the inherent uncertainties of
science with the aspiration to do immediate individual justice in the courts.
B. The Parity Principle, Bias, and Varying Standards
Another aspect of using behavioral genetics in criminal contexts concerns
the comparative uses of the social sciences and the life sciences in criminal trial
contexts. Except in the rarest circumstances, information attempting to explain
extenuating causes of a defendant’s behavior should not be wholly exculpatory
in criminal contexts. Nevertheless, one can readily imagine that information
from advances in behavioral genetics will from time to time be admitted in
criminal trials, during liability phases, sentencing phases, or both. Whether in
the end admitting this evidence is good or bad depends on a variety of factors.
These include the precise purpose for which the information is offered, the
soundness of the underlying science, and the like. But four points bear noting.
First, genes do not “determine” behavior to any extent greater than
environments do. It is true that, in any given case, the behavioral variation
between two groups of people can be explained to a greater or lesser degree by
genes or environment.48 But that fact alone provides no support for the idea
that, when genetic effects are identifiable and present, they should necessarily
have an effect on criminal justice outcomes.
Second, and at least in the context of assessing moral blameworthiness, our
concerns about the extent to which genes “determine” criminal behavior should
not be thought categorically different from our concerns about the extent to
which environments “determine” behavior. If we were somehow trying to
apportion among various causal elements the extent of influence over a
defendant’s behavior, it would initially appear to makes no sense to be more
concerned about an x percent environmental influence than about an x percent
genetic influence. Causes are causes, and what we often attempt to evaluate—
the degree to which a person’s behavior was “free”—should be sensitive to the
extent a cause imposes on freedom, not to the kind of cause it is. That is, one
could legitimately say that although genetics evidence should not receive any
special admissibility privileges, nor should it receive any lesser privileges than
those afforded environmental evidence.49 We might refer to this view as the
parity principle.
Third, this parity principle is problematic when one considers its application
rather than its theoretical justification. Because even when genetic information

48. See discussion supra note 24.
49. Among those who have argued similarly, see Joseph S. Alper, Genes, Free Will and Criminal
Responsibility, 46 SOC. SCI. MED. 1599 (1998).
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about causes and environmental information about causes may share similar
promise and limitations, these types of information may be—and probably
are—dissimilarly incorporated into the minds of judges and jurors. That alone
may provide sufficient justification for treating these two kinds of evidence
differently at trial. This asymmetry in the application of the two kinds of
evidence in the minds of decisionmakers undoubtedly traces, in part, to
common misunderstandings about how biology affects behavior generally, how
behavioral genetics affects behavior specifically, and what statistical and
probabilistic language does and does not mean.50 It may trace, in part, to the
ease with which, and the length of time during which, environmental
conditions—physical abuse, injuries, sociocultural milieu—are observable at the
macroscopic level, compared to the relative difficulty of detecting genes, the
relative novelty of our ability to do so, and the manifest difficulty in
understanding what genes do and how. It likely also has something to do with
apparently widespread public interest in, and frequent over-ascription of
sufficiency to, explanations from the natural sciences, when such explanations
can be offered. But the bottom line is this: if jurors were likely to endow a
quantum of information from behavioral genetics with more significance than
an equivalent quantum of information from the social sciences, treating genetics
and environment identically for analytic purposes may result in systematic bias
in favor of genetic explanations. Education may be an antidote to this bias. But
the potential for bias nonetheless warrants caution and concern.
Finally, there is a potential for bias that cuts precisely the other way. It
results in potential over-favoring of social science insights over behavioral
genetic ones. The problem is this: if social and natural sciences are often
(perhaps improperly) deemed competitive in legal arenas, they should be held
to similar standards for purposes of admissibility.51 For example, holding
information from behavioral genetics to a higher standard than information
from psychology would inevitably favor the latter. Why, for example, should an
inherently uncertain prediction of future dangerousness, based on either
individual or statistical analysis by a psychologist, be admitted any more easily
than an equally uncertain prediction of future dangerousness based on either
individual or statistical analysis by a behavioral geneticist? The likelihood of
the information being held to different standards in law is exacerbated by each
discipline’s having its own standards of what it takes to establish some proffered
piece of information as more probably true than not. Some might say the
natural sciences are more reserved on this score. And the problem of varying
standards between social and life sciences is further compounded by the

50. As an example of the latter, a probability can be dramatically higher in one set of people when
compared with another set, at the same time that the absolute incidence of the behavior on a per capita
basis is still quite low.
51. Owen D. Jones, Brains, Evolution, and Law: Applications and Open Questions, 359 PHIL.
TRANS. R. SOC. LOND. B 1697 (2004).
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unavoidable fact that our legal system already (and quite properly) deploys
different standards in different contexts (such as trials versus legislative action).
VI
CONCLUSION
We are learning a great deal from the bio-behavioral sciences about how
and why humans behave as they do. We now recognize that animals of each
species—including humans—come evolutionarily equipped not only with
behavioral predispositions, but also with proclivities to learn some behaviors far
more easily than others. Evolutionary theory, together with animal studies in
both natural and experimental conditions, helps clarify the patterns in which
social systems can evolve.
Technological advances have enabled
neurobiologists to investigate the operations of single nerve cells in neural
circuits of active animals, to clarify how neurons operate on known principles of
physics and chemistry, and to localize cognitive activities in human brains by
using noninvasive techniques, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging.
And researchers in evolutionary anthropology and evolutionary psychology are
helping to illuminate features of human behavior shared widely around the
world.
We have come increasingly to understand how even the tiniest brains—such
as those of ants—have sufficient complexity to enable highly sophisticated
social behavior, as well as flexible and successful navigation of environmental
challenges. We can see how synaptic connections in the human brain ebb and
flow—not only over long periods, but also across a single day. And we can not
only see how different parts of the brain perform different functions, but we can
also observe in real time how different parts of a brain operate when it is
thinking, analyzing, deciding, or experiencing emotions.
Amidst the swirl of all this activity, the discovery of DNA’s structure in 1953
opened the door to a host of related discoveries about the operations of genes
and development. Developmental biology examines the processes by which
genes and environments interact and guide a brain’s construction and function,
with consequences for developmental psychology, learning, and the evolution of
behavior. And behavioral genetics has helped us to understand some of the
important ways that genes influence behavioral predispositions—some of which
in turn contribute to behaviors that law classifies as criminal. The task now is to
keep the constraints as well as the insights of behavioral genetics in perspective
as it continues to develop as a field and as it continues to intersect with criminal
law. In this brief overview, I have attempted to situate some of the many issues
addressed by other authors in this symposium issue within the larger biological
context. I have also summarized some points of widespread agreement,
highlighted a few complications and implications, and raised a variety of issues
at the inter-section of genes and crime that seem worth exploring.

